NA by Soubagle, Osman N.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1998-09
Jerusalem and the Arab Israeli peace process
Soubagle, Osman N.







Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.








DTIe Ql71iLITY INSPECTED 4
   
  
 





   
  
   
   
       
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction,
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
September 1998 Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS
JERUSALEM AND THE ARAB ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS
6. AUTHOR(S)
Soubagle, Osman N.
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMINGORGANIZATION REPORT
Naval Postgraduate School NUMBER
Monterey, CA 93943-5000




The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of
Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION I AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
Approved for pUblic release; distribution is unlimited.
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
The disposition of Jerusalem is among the handful of 'final status' issues to be negotiated between
Israel and the PLO according to the 1993 Declaration of Principles (the Oslo Accord). This thesis argues that,
unlike other final status issues that are more technical and bilateral in nature, the issue and symbolism of
Jerusalem are so entangled in domestic political processes that negotiated, bilateral resolution has become
virtually impossible. That is, Jerusalem has become a defining issue within both domestic Israeli and
domestic Palestinian political discourse and processes that resolving it equitably has become problematic
even in the best of circumstances. While there is no shortage of creative, viable plans to share Jerusalem,
there is a shortage of the domestic political space necessary to negotiate its resolution. As a general rule, the
more a disputed issue between polities becomes a domestic political issue within the polities, the less likely it
becomes to resolve it through bilateral negotiations.
14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OFJerusalem, Israeli Peace Process, Palestine, Israel, Islamic Jihad, Hamas. PAGES
t;~
16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF 19. SECURITY CLASSIA- CATION 20. LIMITATION
REPORT THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL
NSN 7540-01-280-5500
39-18
Standard Fonn 298 Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std.
        
                      
                   
                     
                 
                
               
    
       
       
  
   
          
    
   
           
 
   
   
                        
     
        
  u l      
     
                
                  
                  
              
               
             
                  
                   
                  
       
   
         
        




   
 
5~ 
   





     
    
ii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
JERUSALEM AND THE ARAB ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS
Osman N. Soubagle
Lieutenant Colonel, Djibouti Armed Force
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of






Glenn E. Robinson, Thesis Advisor
' fL ~agnus,Second. ader
Frank C. Petho, Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs
iii
       
       
   
     
      
     




   
  
     
~ .•• If, • .' ~  
    




The disposition of Jerusalem is among the handful of 'final status' issues to be 
negotiated between Israel and the PLO according to the 1993 Declaration of Principles 
(the Oslo Accord). This thesis argues that, unlike other final status issues that are more 
technical and bilateral in nature, the issue and symbolism of Jerusalem are so entangled 
in domestic political processes that negotiated, bilateral resolution has become virtually 
impossible. That is, Jerusalem has become a defining issue within both domestic Israeli 
and domestic Palestinian political discourse and processes that resolving it equitably has 
become problematic even in the best of circumstances. While there is no shortage of 
creative, viable plans to share Jerusalem, there is a shortage of the domestic political 
space necessary to negotiate its resolution. As a general rule, the more a disputed issue 
between polities becomes a domestic political issue within the polities, the less likely it 
becomes to resolve it through bilateral negotiations. 
v 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A Dome, a Tomb and a Wall; a Crescent, a Cross and a Star. The shrines of three 
faiths-Islam, Christianity, and Judaism-all in one city, Jerusalem. In fact, the holiness of 
Jerusalem can be attributed to these holy shrines: the Church of the Holy Sepulture for 
Christians, the Wailing Wall for Jews, and the Dome of the Rock and al Aqsa Mosque for 
Muslims. All three shrines are located within the ancient walled city, surrounded by the 
believers. We must distinguish between the God-given, holy areas and those added to the 
city by successive government acts in response to population growth. For example, in 
1933, the British High Commissioner expanded the city limits; this did not expand the 
areas of God-given holiness. The essential dispute about Jerusalem concerns not the 
modem secular city-the restaurants, the nightclubs and international hotels-but rather the 
ancient walled city. 1 
The Jerusalem issue is the most Significant and complex part of the permanent 
status negotiations between the Arabs and the Israelis because of its profound resonance 
with both Palestinian Arabs and Israelis. Its absolute centrality derives from neither 
security nor economic considerations, but primarily from emotional and religious 
sensitivities. Political parties and other organizations have used the sacredness of the 
religious sites in Jerusalem to achieve certain objectives. 
This thesis examines the paradoxical centrality of the issue of Jerusalem in the 
Arab-Israeli peace process. It argues for the inherently contradictory relationship 
between the issue of Jerusalem as domestic political symbol for both sides and as an issue 
for negotiated compromise. In short, the degree to which Jerusalem is used for internal 
1 
political purposes (in Israel, for example) directly undermines the prospect for an 
externally-negotiated settlement. The thesis will consist of four chapters and a 
conclusion. 
Chapter II considers the roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This chapter will 
examine the centrality of Jerusalem in the Arab-Israeli disputes beginning at the turn of 
the nineteenth century. It will concentrate on the creation of Zionism and its primary 
goal, as well as the various proposals concerning the fate of Jerusalem, such as the 
internationalization of jerusalem in the 1947 Partition Plan. The chapter will also provide 
a concise discussion of Israel's de facto annexation of Eastern Jerusalem after the Six-
Day War. The point of this chapter is to show that, if seen purely as an issue of bilateral 
negotiations between the disputed parties, the issue of Jerusalem is solvable. There is no 
shortage of creative, viable solutions for sharing Jerusalem. 
Chapter III examines Jerusalem as an Israeli domestic issue. How, for example, 
do the major Israeli political parties use the symbol of Jerusalem to push their own 
domestic agendas? Why, for instance, did the Likud party use Jerusalem as soft spot 
against the Labor party during the 1996 election? This chapter shows the absolute 
centrality of Jerusalem as a political symbol within domestic Israeli politics. Jerusalem 
has become a litmus test of legitimacy for Israeli actors. Israel makes concessions on 
other issues with Arab parties tend to do so, while at the same time compensating for this 
(for domestic purposes) by being more nationalistic over Jerusalem. 
Chapter IV examines Jerusalem as a Palestinian domestic issue. How have Yasser 
Arafat and the Palestinian Authority used Jerusalem as a symbol to advance their political 
agenda? Arafat and others in the PA routinely use a discourse of jihad (holy war) 
2 
concerning Jerusalem and speak of it as the capital of the future state. Opponents to 
peace, such as Barnas and Islamic Jihad, vowed to fight both the PLO and the Israelis to 
liberate Jerusalem for the Islamic world. This chapter shows that the Palestinian 
Authority's use of the symbol of Jerusalem for domestic political purposes (primarily as a 
response to Barnas) undermines the very prospect of a negotiated settlement with 
significant symbolic concessions. 
Chapter V, the conclusion, discusses how domestic political uses of the symbol of 
Jerusalem undermines the ability of the conflicting parties to reach a negotiated bilateral 
settlement over it. Jerusalem is the only final issue that carries with it such momentous 




II. THE ROOTS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 
At the tum of the nineteenth century, most of the Arab Middle East was under the 
rule of the Ottoman Empire, which was nearing collapse. Compared to western European 
nations, the Ottoman Empire was backward and undeveloped and lacked modem 
industry. The European states of Great Britain, Germany, France, and Russia looked 
greedily at the fading empire. All these nations had important trade interests in the 
Middle East and Far East, and they hoped to expand their military and economic power 
by taking control of the Ottoman Empire. Great Britain was especially interested in the 
Middle East because it was so near Britain's most prized possession, India.2 Both France 
and Great Britain had already gained control of regions around the Suez Canal, an 
important shipping passage that halved the time required to transport goods from the Far 
East to Europe. These two nations would play an important role in the conflict that was 
brewing between Arabs and Jews. 
A. ZIONISM AND THE BRITISH MANDATE IN PALESTINE 
For centuries, the Jewish people had a religious and cultural identity, but no 
formalized nation. Throughout the centuries, they had been subject to persecution and 
anti-Semitism, especially in Europe. In response to these circumstances, an Austrian 
newspaperman, Theodor Herzl, founded a movement called Zionism in the late l800s. 
Herzl was convinced that the only way for Jews to be safe from anti-Semitism was to live 
in a Jewish state. He and his followers believed the Jewish state should be located in the 
ancient promised land of Palestine. Zionist leaders adopted his position in the platform of 
5 
their 1897 congress: the aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish pe<?ple a home in 
Palestine secured by public laws. 3 
A small minority of Jews had been living in Palestine for centuries, but now 
European Jews began immigrating to the area. They bought land and established farms 
and settlements. In 1918, the population in Palestine numbered about 700,000 Arabs and 
56,000 Jews. Arabs were concerned that the influx of Jews would derail their own plans 
for an independent Arab state. The Arabs had been under Ottoman rule for centuries and, 
like the Jews, wanted a state under their own political control. Both the Arabs and the 
Jews hoped to make Palestine the site of their independent states. Palestine would soon 
become a battleground of these conflicting interests as the world powers moved toward 
war. 4 
Until the First World War, there was no Palestinian problem. This stems from the 
fact that when the British took Palestine from the Turks, the Arabs were an 
overwhelming majority in the country. The conflict began when Jewish immigrants, 
under the terms of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, arrived in sufficient numbers 
to lead the Arabs of Palestine to believe they were threatened-as well as betrayed. That 
conflict was never resolved. And an inseparable part of the problem was the 
contradictory promises regarding the future of Palestine which the British had made 
during their wartime negotiations with the Arabs, with the Jews, and with the French and 
their other Allies-at the very time that President Wilson's Fourteen Points gave 
expression to a rising sprit of national self determination. The problem is still with us 
today, after four wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973,) and a peace agreement with Egypt.5 
6 
In 1915, the British, anxious to gain Arab support in the war against Turkey, 
exchanged letters (known as the McMahon Correspondence) with the Sharif Hussein of 
Mecca regarding the terms and conditions under which the Arab people, for whom he 
acted as spokesman, would enter the war. The Arabs asked that, in return for their entry 
into the war, the British recognize their independence. While the wording of the British 
commitment (dated October 24, 1915) was vague as to the precise area that would 
become independent after the war, the Arabs understood-and have continued to claim-
that Palestine was included this area. In keeping with their agreement with the British, the 
Arabs launched their revolt in June 1916 and contributed significantly to the war effort 
against Turks. By early 1918, more Turkish troops were engaged against Arab forces 
than against British forces. At the end of the war, the entire area in which Arab 
independence would be recognized had been liberated, and the Arabs felt they had 
fulfilled their part of the bargain.6 
The British, however, also made a wartime commitment to the Jews. During the 
early part of the war, the Zionists in Great Britain-most notably Chaim Weizmann, who 
was doing war work for the British Admiralty-were in frequent touch with leaders of the 
British government to persuade them to make some expression of official sympathy with 
Jewish aspirations regarding Palestine. On November 2, 1917, the foreign secretary, 
Arthur Balfour, wrote the head of the British Zionist Federation a letter which has come 
to be known as Balfour Declaration. BalfOur wrote, in language deliberately vague, that 
his Majesty's government favored the "establishment in Palestine of a national home for 
the Jewish people," on the condition that nothing to be done to "prejudice the civil and 
7 
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political 
status enjoyed in any other country."? 
There was an almost complete lack of knowledge (on the part of the British) as to 
the actual situation in Palestine. Practically no one seems to have realized that the 
"existing non-Jewish communities" mentioned by Balfour represented nearly 90 percent 
of Palestine's inhabitants at the beginning of the war. 
In December 1917, the British forces under Allenby entered Jerusalem, and by the 
following summer, all of Palestine had been freed of Turkish rule and placed under 
British administration. At the outset, Arab leaders did not display much concern over the 
implications of the Balfour Declaration. In fact, the Amir Faysal, who had been 
prominent in the Arab revolt and in the movement for independence, held two meetings 
with Dr. Weizmann, and signed an agreement with him providing for the implementation 
of the Balfour Declaration and for the encouragement of large-scale Jewish immigration . 
into Palestine. Faysal, however, made his concurrence conditional upon the fulfillment 
by the British of their pledges regarding independence, and the agreement with 
Weizmann fell through.8 
The situation with respect to immigration changed markedly in the 1930s, with 
the threat and the reality of Hitler's assuming power in Germany. By 1939, the Jews, 
who in the first census of 1922 had totaled 84,000 or 13 percent of a population of 
649,000, totaled 450,000 or 30 percent of the now one and a half million people in the 
region. The Arabs of Palestine reacted to this increased immigration of the Jews by 
launching a campaign of outright terrorism. By 1936, the situation had deteriorated to 
such an extent that the British government appointed a Royal Commission (the Peel 
8 
Commission) to examine the problem. The Peel Commission's solution was the 
termination of the Mandate and the partition of the country into Arab and Jewish states, 
with a Jerusalem enclave remaining under British administration.9 
At the outbreak of the Second World War, the country became relatively quiet as 
the emphasis shifted to Hitler's Europe, where the systematic annihilation of millions of 
Jews shocked the conscience of mankind and convinced many, both Jews and non-Jews, 
that the Jews had to have a state of their own. In fact, in 1942, in the midst of the war, at 
a Zionist convention at the Biltmore Hotel in the New York City, the Zionists, for the 
first time in their history, came out officially for the creation of a Jewish state in 
Palestine. 10 
B. THE UNITED NATIONS' PARTITION PLAN 
In April 1947, a special session of the United Nations General Assembly met and 
set up a commission, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, or UNSCOP. 
This body submitted majority and minority reports for consideration by the General 
Assembly in the autumn. The majority report, which was based on the assumption that 
Jewish and Arab claims were irreconcilable, proposed the partition of the country. There 
would be a Jewish state and an Arab state in economic union with each other, and an area 
surrounding Jerusalem would be placed under United Nations administration. 
When the majority report was made public, the Zionists gave it their reluctant 
. 
approval, while the Arabs came out strongly against it. In the General Assembly, the 
United States backed the proposal and worked hard behind the scenes to bring about its 
adoption. The Soviet Union also supported partition. On November 29, 1947, the 
9 
majority plan, with some modifications, was approved by the Assembly by a vote of 33 
to 13, with 10 abstentions. The British were with those who abstained. ll 
The security situation in Palestine grew worse, with increased terrorist activity 
and the outbreak of actual fighting between Arabs and Jews. The United Nations 
Palestine Commission, which had been established by the November 29, 1947 resolution 
of the General Assembly, reported to the Security General that an international police 
force would be necessary to implement partition. Such, however, was not established. 
C. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 
Events were moving too fast: the British continued to make plans for their 
withdrawal from Palestine (scheduled for mid-May, 1948); the Jews continued to make 
plans for setting up their state; and the Arabs continued to make plans for opposing this 
by force. As the ship bearing the last British High Commissioner sailed from Haifa port 
late on May 14,1948, leaders of the Jewish community, who had laid careful plans for 
this day, met in Tel Aviv and proclaimed the state of Israel. President Truman recognized 
the new state. Simultaneously, Arab forces from Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Syria and 
Lebanon, advanced and engaged in fighting with Jewish forces. It was then that the 
majority of the Arab refugees left, creating the Arab refugee problem. After a bitter fight, 
the Israelis also secured a corridor to Jerusalem. The city itself was occupied partly by 
them and partly by the Arabs. 12 
The Security Council ordered a cease-fire, and the United Nations' acting 
mediator, Dr. Ralph Bunche, (the replacement for Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden, 
who was assassinated in September 1948) met with Israeli and Arab representatives on 
the Island'of Rhodes. There, Bunche skillfully conducted long and difficult negotiations 
10 
which finally culminated in the Armistice Agreements of 1949 between Israel and its four 
Arab neighbors-Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan (with Iraq represented by Jordan). 
The armistice settlement did not provide a solution for Jerusalem, which 
continued to be divided between Israel and Jordan with the cease-fire line running 
through the city. In 1948 and 1949, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed a 
resolution reaffirming support for the concept of an international city under the UN, but 
the next year, 1950, the Assembly failed to agree on any plan for the internationalization, 
and there the matter was allowed to rest for seventeen years. 13 
11 
12 
Ill. ISRAEL'S DOMESTIC USE OF JERUSALEM 
For the Jews, Jerusalem has been the pre-eminent focus of their spiritual, cultural, 
and national life for a long time. The foremost Jewish Holy Place in Jerusalem is the 
Wailing (or Western) wall, the sole remnant of the Temple Mount enclosure dating back 
to the First and Second Temples. 
This chapter will first discuss Israel's de facto annexation of Eastern Jerusalem; it 
will then examine how the major political actors of Israel's political parties (Likud and 
Labor) use the issue of Jerusalem to further their domestic agendas and also to defame 
each other's political opponents. Finally, this chapter will analyze the 1996 election and 
how the political actors of both parties and their allies used Jerusalem to win political 
power. 
A. DE FACTO ANNEXATION OF EASTERN JERUSALEM 
Rabbi Kohen, Deputy Mayor' of Jerusalem, said at a Municipal Council meeting 
on August 13, 1967: 
I dare say frankly that we have to do everything within our power to make 
Greater Jerusalem the largest Jewish city in the world, a real Jewish city, 
both in terms of population numbers and in giving a permanent Jewish 
character to the whole city.14 
When the Six-Day War broke out in June 1967, the Israeli Defense Forces 
captured and then annexed East Jerusalem. Their objective was to consolidate Israeli 
sovereignty, which was based on its control ofland and its application oflaw. The Israeli 
government passed legislation incorporating East Jerusalem and adjacent parts of the 
West Bank into Israel. Israel had established its own legal basis for its sovereignty over 
13 
West Jerusalem through the first law of the Israeli Provisional Government, the Law and 
Administrative Ordinance of 1948, which applied Israeli jurisdiction over all areas held 
by Israeli military forces. Through an amendment of the same law, Israel, in 1967, 
proceeded to incorporate East Jerusalem and adjacent parts of the West Bank. These 
measures were adopted in order to integrate Jerusalem into the administrative and 
municipal sphere of a Jewish city. In addition, in 1980, the Basic Law, that Jerusalem 
was the capital of Israel, reaffirmed the Israeli position and also excluded any reference 
to the annexation and sovereignty of the city on the part of Israelis. 15 
However, the position of the international community was that East Jerusalem 
was occupied territory and that Israel must abide by the international laws governing 
occupied powers. That position was already in conflict with the government's claim that 
East Jerusalem had been liberated and "unified," and not occupied. 
The "Basic Law of Jerusalem" reads as follows: 
1. Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel. 
2. Jerusalem is the seat of the President of the State, the Knesset, the Government and 
the Supreme Court. 
3. The Holy Places shall be protected from desecration and other violation and from 
anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different religions 
to the places sacred to them or their feelings towards those places. 
4. (a) The Government shall provide for the development and prosperity of Jerusalem 
and the well being of its inhabitants by allocation special funds, including a special 
annual grant to the Municipality of Jerusalem (Capital City Grant) with the approval of 
the Finance Committee of the Knesset. 
14 
(b) Jerusalem shall be given special priority in the activities of the authorities of the 
State so as to further its development in economic and other matters. 
(c) The government shall set up special bodies for the implementation of this section. 
Signed by Menahem Begin, Prime Minister, and Yitzchak Navon, President of the 
State. 16 
The main purpose of this law was political rather than juridical. It did not legislate 
any changes, but underlined the political reality of existing Israeli legislation. It also 
complicated an already tangled problem and tended to obscure available legal, political, 
and administrative options for the city's future that might have garnered significant 
support among both Israelis and Palestinians. 
What encouraged their decision, according to Israel's argument, was the division 
of Jerusalem after 1948. The displacement of Jews from the Jewish Quarter of the Old 
City; the isolation of Mt. Scopus; the lack of Jewish access to the Western Wall and other 
holy sites in Jordanian-held East Jerusalem; all of these factors impressed upon many 
Israeli political, military and religious leaders, as well as the Jewish public, the 
importance of measures which would ensure Jewish control over the entire city. Besides 
that, Israel uses several other factors to justify its insistence today on maintaining control 
over the entire city and its immediate hinterland. According to Jewish tradition, 
Jerusalem is at the very heart of the history of Judaism and the struggle for a Jewish 
homeland; many Israelis are convinced that the city is theirs by divine right. Furthermore, 
Israelis feel strongly that Jordan's participation and defeat in thel967 War justifies 
Israel's retention of the city. 
15 
Despite Israel's pretext of the annexation, international law (Hague Regulations) 
does not permit a change in the permanent status of belligerently occupied territory; it 
permits and requires the occupier to assume responsibility for the basic needs of the 
inhabitants. 17 
Finally, strategic factors playa crucial role: permanent Israeli control over the city 
and its hinterland would divide the West Bank in two, thereby weakening the embryonic 
Palestinian autonomy (or state) by fragmenting it into smaller components-the Gaza 
Strip, the northern West Bank, and the southern West Bank. Israel's control also has the 
prospect of creating a direct link from Israel to the Jordanian border, bypassing the 
Palestinian State, and thereby avoiding any economic leverage a Palestinian government 
may have over Israel. 18 
B. JERUSALEM: THE CENTER OF ISRAELI POLICY 
Jerusalem plays an important role in Israeli domestic issues. It provides the 
mortar for national unity in an otherwise politically divided country. Israel's insistence 
on Jewish control of Jerusalem unites the Orthodox Jews with their more secular 
counterparts, the Ashkenazi elite and 'groWing numbers of Sephardi and oriental 
immigrants. As the blurred contours of the peace settlement become more distinct, the 
perception of external threat from other Arab states has weakened, but has exacerbated 
the deep divisions within Israeli society, especially the political parties. 19 
C. IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LABOR AND LIKUD 
The two major rivals with divergent ideologies and beliefs are the Likud and 
Labor parties. The majority of the Israeli people fall behind these two political parties, 
although several other political groups exist. The Likud Party and its allies advocate 
l6 
keeping the occupied territories for many reasons, including security. Citing military and 
intelligence assessments, some public and others classified, many Israelis claim that 
withdrawal to the 1967 boundaries would be detrimental to the defense of the country-
tantamount to "national suicide." They argue that the West Bank provides crucial 
"strategic depth" allowing the IDF more time to repel an invasion. Also, according to the 
Likud, the 1967 borders create an Israel which is so thin at the middle that it could be 
easily cut in half by an attacking Arab force. In fact, after his defeat in the Israeli election 
of June 1992, former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, from the Likud party, admitted that 
his policy towards Arab-Israeli peace talks was to stall, while creating more "facts on the 
ground" intended to solidify Israel's hold on the Palestinian and other Arab territories 
occupied since 1967. 
The Israeli Labor party, on the other hand, has a different view on the Occupied 
Territories. While some Labor hawks advocated keeping the land for security reasons, 
most saw the land in 1967, and still do today, as a bargaining chip. UN Resolution 242 
was the formula which Labor politicians had in mind as soon as the war ended. Despite 
the political differences of the two parties, there is one issue which united them: the 
"status of Jerusalem." Both parties agreed to keep Jerusalem as a united city under Israeli 
sovereignty. 
D. THE LABOR PARTY IN POWER (1992-96) 
The election of a new government in Israel, led by the Labor Party of Yitzhak 
Rabin, was widely perceived as an event bound to create a new and positive environment 
for the Arab-Israeli talks. This optimistic prognosis for the effects of Likud's defeat, 
17 
however, quickly became questionable as the new Israeli government continued the hard-
line policies of Yitzhak Shamir in its negotiations, as well as in its practice on the ground. 
It was agreed that, although the defeat of the Likud in Israel created a new potential for 
progress, the impact of Labor's victory had been exaggerated. Arab leaders considered 
Rabin a vast improvement over Shamir and were hopeful that progress towards peace 
could be made. Undoubtedly, this was due to his acceptance of the basic land-for-peace 
formula, whereas Shamir had rejected the formula. However, there was some pessimism 
in the occupied territories.20 The new government did not intend to curb new settlements. 
in their expanded version of East Jerusalem. Rabin was dedicated to the concept of a 
"greater Jerusalem" and explicitly ruled out withdrawal to the 1967 border and the 
creation of a Palestinian state as the outcome of a final status agreement. 21 It became 
obvious that the Labor party was as zealous as Likud in safeguarding Jerusalem, but with 
more circumspection. 
Despite little progress in the peace talks, the Likud party and other annexationist 
politicians were against the comparatively political overtures of the Labor administration 
towards the peace process. They criticized the new government and its supporters for 
agreeing to permit Palestinians in East Jerusalem to vote in the proposed elections, and 
for accepting wording in future negotiations that could imply the possibility of 
compromise on the status of the city. Yitzhak Shamir (Likud) attacked this political move 
of the Labor government and condemned Prime Minister Rabin and his supporters for 
being ready to relinquish the land of Israel. In February 1990, Shamir argued that once 
the government allowed East Jerusalem to vote in West Bank elections, it would not 
remain in the territory of Israel. 
18 
However, the permanence of Israel's sovereignty over the expanded East 
Jerusalem had not yet achieved "ideological status," despite the strength of the consensus. 
Ambitious politicians occasionally suggest the possibility of compromise regarding 
Jerusalem when it suits their political aims. Various government factions have used the 
issues of future boundaries and the exact geographical definition of Jerusalem in their 
endless political discussion over city elections, municipal boundaries, residential status of 
Arabs and Jews, etc. Using Jerusalem as a partisan political weapon was not only a sign 
of hegemonic failure, but it also encouraged compromise regarding Israel's assumption of 
complete sovereignty over Jerusalem. 
A letter addressed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Johan Jorgen,Holst, from 
the Israeli Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, was leaked to the public on October 11, 1994. 
The purpose of Peres's letter was to confirm and convey to his Norwegian counterpart 
that the Palestinian Institution of East Jerusalem and the well-being of the Palestinians of 
East Jerusalem are of great importance and would be preserved. Peres added: 
All Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem, including all economic, 
social, educational and cultural institutions as well as the Christian and 
Muslim Holy Places are performing an essential task for the Palestinian 
population. The Government of Israel will not hamper their activity; on 
the contrary the fulfillment of this important mission is to be encouraged?2 
Many Israelis became angry; the Likud party and the annexationists used this 
political incident to their advantage and labeled the Labor government as traitors. As a 
result, to offset possible public mistrust of the government, the Knesset passed a 
resolution, introduced by a hawkish Labor parliamentarian and supported by all parties 
on the right of Labor, reaffirming that "united Jerusalem is under Israeli sovereignty and 
there will be no negotiations on its unity and status. ,,23 The purpose of the resolution was 
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identical to that of the Jerusalem Law, to force Israeli politicians to go on record against 
any compromise regarding its present status. 
To the Likud and its allies on the right, their policy was making a fetish out of 
Jerusalem: the fixation of Jewish authority over Palestinians. But it was certain that no 
Arab partner would sign a comprehensive peace agreement permitting Jewish sovereignty 
over an expanded East Jerusalem. It is this political dynamite that has continued to make 
the city of Jerusalem such a volatile center of political negotiations. For example, in May 
1982, the Begin government issued an ultimatum that further negotiations with Egypt and 
the US over autonomy for Palestinians would be unconceivable unless the talks were held 
in the three capitals of the contending countries, Cairo, Washington, and Jerusalem. The 
demand was refused by the Egyptians in their protest against Israel's treatment of 
expanded East Jerusalem asa part of its capital city.24 
According to A. Alon, in a Maa'iv commentary published in August 1992, the 
Rabin government's peace efforts were doomed by challenging the national consensus on 
Jerusalem. By opposing Judaization efforts in Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, he 
argued, the Rabin government made public its "unthinkable position regarding 
Jerusalem;" i.e., that after withdrawal from Nablus, Gaza, and Hebron, a similar 
compromise on East Jerusalem would be accepted. Of course, by accusing the Rabin 
government and its allies of harboring these thoughts, the author undermined the very 
claim he sought to advance; i.e., that among Israelis, the idea of compromise on 
Jerusalem is "unthinkable.,,2s 
Prime Minister Rabin used his own commitment to the issue of Jerusalem to 
defend his nationalist credentials against right-wing vilification. He first acknowledged 
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the consensus shared by an overwhelming majority of Israeli Jews that a "united city" 
should serve as Israel's capital. Moreover, Rabin clarified his position on the issue of 
Jerusalem in a statement to the Knesset at the opening of its summer session on May 15, 
1995. The Prime Minister declared before the Knesset that his government, like all its 
predecessors, believed that there was no disagreement in the house concerning Jerusalem 
as the eternal capital of Israel. He continued his statement, reiterating that united 
Jerusalem had been and would forever be the capital of the Jewish people, under Israeli 
sovereignty. He also confirmed before the Knesset that his administration would not open 
negotiations concerning the status of Jerusalem. In the same speech, the Prime Minister 
announced clearly that he would spare no effort in bringing about peace.
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Through these contradictory statements, the Labor government was caught in a 
political vise, squeezed between its obsessive devotion to an expanded Jerusalem ahd its 
belief that peace was both possible and necessary. 
The Likud leaders engineered another tactical move to vilify the Labor 
government before the Jewish people. The new Likud mayor, Ehud Olmert, organized the 
"Jerusalem 3000 Extravaganza" of 1995-96. His purpose was to undermine the ongoing 
Israel-Palestinian negotiations. Unable to oppose the celebration, or even advocate more 
tactful ways to conduct it, Prime Minister Rabin found himself in a political dilemma. 
Nevertheless, he managed to explain his commitment to building a united Jerusalem as 
the capital of Israel by participating in the inauguration of Jerusalem 3000 festivities ,in 
Washington DC. on October 25, 1995.
27 In his address, Rabin reaffirmed his loyalty to 
the city and expounded clearly what the city meant to the Jewish and Israeli people. 
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Again, the Prime Minister clearly said "There is only one Jerusalem for us, Jerusalem is 
not subject to compromise, nor can there be peace without it. ,,28 
The Likud party and annexationists have clung to the set ideology that the city is 
bound by history and religion to Judaism and, as a consequence, the Jewish Holy City 
should be administered by a Jewish Government. The Labor party, on the other hand, 
had it not feared losing the support of those Israeli nationalists within the party, would 
have more realistically been inclined to support the concept of exchanging part of the city 
for a lasting peace. 
E. JERUSALEM IN THE 1996 ISRAELI ELECTION 
By observing Israel's 1996 electoral campaign, one could get a clear picture of the 
divergence of public opinion towards the final status of Jerusalem. During the election 
campaign of 1996, the Likud and its allies used Jerusalem to vilify the Labor Party. They 
publicized that Peres "will divide Jerusalem." 
As usual, both Labor and the Likud aimed their election broadcasts at the 
"floating voters." The two parties have assumed that these voters, while generally 
supporting the peace process, were not convinced that Labor, led by Peres, could be 
trusted to achieve the best possible agreements for Israel without giving up too much or 
taking too many security risks. 
In its effort to convince floating voters that Labor, in general, and Peres, in 
particular, were untrustworthy, the Likud focused on Jerusalem, harping on one specific 
message: "Peres will divide Jerusalem." To prove its allegation, the Likud party quoted 
Yasser Arafat's demagogic addresses to mass rallies in which he had listed all the cities 
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Israel had agreed to hand over to Palestinian control. The last city on the list was 
Jerusalem. 29 
Asfour (Labor) stated: 
The whole issue of Jerusalem has now become a major theme of the 
Israeli election, of the fight between the Labor and Likud parties. This is 
not good. It only sparks incorrect rumors and charges. (Jerusalem Mayor 
Ehud Olmert) is trying to use Jerusalem to win the election for the Likud, 
by making all kinds of accusations about the government's plans in 
Jerusalem. 3o 
Prime Minister Shimon Peres said on May 27, 1996, in a speech to 50 mayors 
from around the world, "All the reports of plans to divide Jerusalem were false. There 
was no intention to divide the city." Peres later said at a visit to Tel Nof Air Base: 
I want to stress that Jerusalem is not just united, but it also unites us all. 
We all are united in a clear decision to keep Jerusalem as a united city, as 
the capital of Israel and not the capital of two states. I do not see that there 
will be any change in those positions of ours. 31 
Teddy Kollek, (Labor) mayor of Jerusalem until 1993, denied the Likud's party 
allegation that Peres would divide Jerusalem and argued that Jerusalem was not nearly as 
central an issue as many politicians were trying to make it; he said: 
[T]he country has much more burning topics to deal with than the final 
settlement on Jerusalem. Indeed our continued sovereignty over the city is 
one of the few topics about which there is a national consensus. Right 
now other issues are more important to Israel as a whole, and to Jerusalem 
itself. For instance, the growing abyss between secular and Orthodox Jews 
is much more dangerous than Arafat's ambitions regarding the city. It is 
unlikely that either a Labor or a Likud government would give half of 
Jerusalem to the Palestinians; but the city's loss of industry and of its 
productive, secular citizens, especially the young ones, is becoming a very 
real danger. 32 
Teddy Kollek blamed his adversary for bringing up Jerusalem's political future 
again and again for no reason. At the same time, social and economic issues of the utmost 
importance remain utterly neglected. 
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The Labor Party's secretary general, Nissim Zvilli, proposed that the Jerusalem 
issue be removed from the national election agenda; but the Likud's plan to kick off its 
campaign with Jerusalem was given top priority. "The entire nation is united on the 
Jerusalem issue, and there is no sense in raising it as a bone of contention when in fact it 
is not," Zvilli said. "Moreover, doing so may give the (Arabs) the impression that we 
really are divided on Jerusalem and there is something to talk about." But Zvilli's 
proposal was categorically rejected by the Likud and its allies, who argued that Labor 
was indeed afraid of this issue because there was something happening behind the scenes 
despite all of Labor's denials, the party's spokeswoman said.
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The Likud began running ads in the press and on billboards claiming that Labor 
would redivide Jerusalem. The Likud's campaign suggested that secret Oslo-style talks 
were already in progress in Europe about the future arrangements in Jerusalem. Since 
this followed Prime Minister Shimon Peres's denial, the Likud line in effect challenged 
Peres's credibility. The Likud saw the Jerusalem issue as Labor's soft spot, and the one 
with which the Likud stood the best chance of making some electoral impact. Tsomet 
leader Rafael Eitan said that he fully supported the idea of making Jerusalem the central 
theme of the joint Likud-Tsomet campaign. He added: 
Secret negotiations on the division of Jerusalem were already carried out 
in Europe, and Zvilli's demand to keep the Jerusalem issue out of the 
electoral campaigns showed lack of honesty and has demonstrated deceit, 
just as the Labor Party decided that the consensus on the Golan Heights 
issue in the last elections meant the subject could have been taken off the 
agenda, only to later agree to give the Golan Heights to Syria with nothing 
in retum.34 
Generally, Laborites' judgements tend to be presented in pragmatic rather than 
ideological terms. The Labor leadership has always displayed sensitivity to outside 
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constraints. Despite its close relationship with the United States since the 1967 War, 
Israel has faced international difficulties and even isolation. Labor's rather pragmatic 
outlook took into consideration growing international acceptance of the PLO and 
worldwide displeasure at the Israeli military presence in the occupied territories. Most 
significantly, Laborites heeded U.S policy. Since 1973, the United States has made 
unprecedented efforts to mediate between Israel and its neighbors. 
Consequently, Labor placed the demographic problem on the Israeli political 
agenda. This was part of Labor's campaign to point out the problem connected with 
annexation, which some of its political rivals on the right were advocating. Essentially, 
the demographic problem meant that the Jews would not be able to maintain a majority in 
western Palestine, including east Jerusalem. Therefore, Labor argued cogently, 
annexation could only result in the establishment of a bi-national state. 
Labor, although stressing in their analysis and their political prescriptions the 
perceived process of moderation among the Arabs, did not rule out the possibility of 
future wars. Ironically, the Laborites are much more worried than the Likud about 
imminent war. 
Teddy Kollek could not resist all these allegations, which he suspected might 
damage the party's credibility if proper actions were not taken. To show to the public 
what the Labor party had done for country, he referred to the peace made by Likud with 
Egypt and stressed that it was the Likud that gave up every inch of Sinai and uprooted all 
the settlements there. It was a Labor-led government that united Jerusalem. 
Kollek admitted that when a political party, be it the Likud or Labor, is in power 
and wants to achieve meaningful results, especially a dramatic result such as peace, it will 
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make compromises. But it is doubtful that any significant political figure, certainly not 
within the two major parties, has ever contemplated giving up eastern Jerusalem. 
Kollek continued his comments: "We will be able to keep Jerusalem only if we give 
equal conditions to all sectors of its population including the Palestinians." Kollek 
undermined Likud's allegation, stressing that tough-sounding slogans reveal a lack of real 
strength, foresight, wisdom, statesmanship and responsibility. He criticized the Jerusalem 
Law of 1980, saying that Geula Cohen CLikud) submitted a bill declaring Jerusalem the 
eternal capital of Israel. Kollek argued that this law was senseless; no other country 
makes such statements about its capital. Moreover, he stated, the law enabled Israel's 
adversaries to demand in the UN that all embassies leave Jerusalem. The result was that 
15 embassies moved and only those of Panama and EI Salvador remained. Nothing 
whatsoever was gained. Kollek stated: 
We all want peace with Jerusalem. But we have to work for it, not 
advertise. I have no doubt that Labor and its partners can unite the city, 
and the Likud bloc cannot. Those who want the Likud election slogan to 
be a reality should therefore vote for the other side, (Labor). The Likud 
does not promise all Jerusalem citizens equal rights.35 
F. CONCLUSION 
Jerusalem acts as a symbol of national unity in an otherwise politically divided 
country. It boosts legitimacy to political powers when legitimization weakens without 
popular mandate. Both Labor and Likud leaders reiterated on Jerusalem Day that united 
Jerusalem will remain under Israeli sovereignty eternally. The Labor party accepted the 
land-for-peace formula, whereas the Likud party rejected it. The Likud party used the 
"Jerusalem" example (i.e., Peres wants to redivide Jerusalem) to vilify the Labor party 
during the 1996 electoral campaign. The Labor party denied that allegation. But one thing 
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is fact: Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem is one of the few topics about which there is a 
national consensus. This shows that the focus on Jerusalem as a political symbol within 
domestic Israeli politics outweighs the rest of Israel. It would be political suicide for any 
political actor or statesman to compromise on the issue of Jerusalem in any negotiation 
for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. 
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IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JERUSALEM IN PALESTINIAN ARAB 
POLITICS 
Jerusalem is the historic capital of Arab Palestine. The largest Arab city in the 
country, it is universally regarded by Palestinians everywhere as the focus of their 
national aspirations. A just and lasting peace in the Middle East is not possible, and there 
can never be Arab recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, without the city being 
equally recognized by Israel as the capital of Palestine. This was vividly expressed during 
the events of September 1996, which followed Israel's opening of a tunnel beside al-Aqsa 
Mosque. During these events, 62 Palestinians and 16 Israeli soldiers were killed, and 
another 1600 Palestinians were wounded. 
This chapter will examine how the PLO became a legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people. It will also discuss the centrality of the Jerusalem issue in Palestinian 
politics. And, finally, this chapter will analyze how different opponents of the peace 
process (Hamas, Islamic Jihad) declare jihad against both Arafat and the Israelis to 
undermine the Peace Process. 
A. THE PLO: A LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF PALESTINIAN LAND 
King Abdullah of Transjordan was adamant in his opposition to the 
internationalization of Jerusalem. He saw it as a threat to the legitimacy of his dynasty 
and to his greater Syria aspirations. In contrast, the other Arab states were in favor of 
internationalization, and the Arab League passed a number of resolutions to that effect. 
In 1949, the Palestinian Arab Congress in Jericho voted for a union between the West 
Bank and Transjordan. East Jerusalem was naturally included in this union. In 1960, King 
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Hussein of Jordan announced that Jerusalem had been given amana status (trusteeship) 
and would become the second capital of Jordan.36 
As the All-Palestine government began to fade in effectiveness, new nationalist 
groups appeared. These groups were disappointed by the failure of the Arab governments 
to destroy Israel and win a Palestinian homeland. They were determined to rely on their 
own efforts to achieve their goal. Yassir Arafat was one of the founders of the largest 
and most influential of these groups, Fatah, an Arabic word meaning "conquest" or 
"victory." Unlike other groups, Fatah's sole aim was to establish a Palestinian state. 
Fatah called on young men to become guerrilla fighters, or Fidayeen, literally "men of 
sacrifice." 37 
In 1964, Nasser called a meeting for the Arab League and urged the establishment 
of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Nasser wanted to keep the unruly 
Palestinian guerrilla fighters under his control so that they would not force the Arab 
world into a w~ it did not want to fight. 
The stated purpose of the PLO was to destroy Israel and to establish a Palestinian 
homeland. The charter declaring its principles was adopted on June 1, 1964. The charter 
claimed that "Palestine is an Arab homeland," and article 19 of the charter claimed that 
Israel had no right to exist. In 1969, Arafat was elected PLO chairman. In 1974, the 
Rabat summit of the Arab League recognized the PLO as the "sole legitimate" 
representative of the Palestinians.38 
King Hussein sent a letter to Mr. Rabin in which he reiterated Jordan's position on 
Jerusalem. The letter said that Jerusalem is part of the occupied territories and must be 
returned to Palestinian sovereignty. The King severed legal and administrative links with 
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the West Bank in July 1988, after the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising. In November, 
the PLO declared a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East 
Jerusalem as its capital. 
In 1991, the United States organized peace talks between Israel and the Arab 
states. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel insisted that Israel would not negotiate 
with any representatives from the PLO. However, the Palestinians insisted that the PLO 
was the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. In 1992, Israel elected a new 
prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, a General during 1967 Six-Day War, who had captured 
the new territories for Israel. Rabin, politically more moderate than Shamir, was willing 
to make some concessions for peace. According to Israeli wishes, the PLO was excluded 
from the negotiations altogether. It soon became clearer, however, that Palestinian 
delegates had little power to implement any agreements they might reach. In the 
meantime, the PLO's influence with the Palestinians in the occupied territories was 
beginning to decline, and Islamic fundamentalist groups such as Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad, which were financed by Inin, were drawing support. The Israelis believed that Iran 
was developing nuclear weapons and would soon pose a far greater threat to Israel than 
that posed by the PLO. To Prime Minister Rabin and the Israelis, Arafat was becoming 
the lesser of two evils. 39 
B. JERUSALEM AS THE CENTER OF PALESTINIAN ARAB POLITICS 
Israel's occupation of the rest of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza Strip) in 1967 
aggravated the Arab-Israeli conflict in many ways. The denial of Palestinian national 
rights became total; the colonization of the West Bank and Gaza threatened to make the 
denial permanent; and the occupation of the eastern half of Jerusalem injected a highly 
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emotional content into the conflict. The fate and future of Jerusalem became an exclusive 
issue when Israel unilaterally annexed it and declared it to be "non-negotiable." 
In the preparations for the Peace Talks, Arafat played an important role in 
convincing his people of the concept of peace. He promised that a Palestinian state was 
within grasp, and that soon the flag would fly above the walls, the minarets and the 
cathedrals of Jerusalem. When the Oslo peace accord was signed in 1993, nothing was 
as easy as it seemed to be. It was agreed that the status of the city of Jerusalem would be 
the last issue to be addressed simply because it was so difficult. Peace talks between 
Israel and the Palestinians over the status of the Holy City were scheduled to begin in 
1996. However, the continued terrorist attacks against Israel delayed the implementation 
of the peace accord. Exactly when the talks about Jerusalem will begin remains 
uncertain. 
When Benjamin Netanyahu was elected Israeli Prime Minister in 1996, he 
approved the expansion of existing settlements, including the creation of new 
neighborhoods. This would expand Jerusalem's boundaries westward to increase the 
Jewish population. Arafat warned that the government's new plan for strengthening 
Israel's hold over all of Jerusalem could dash the last hopes for peace. Arafat said: "Our 
Legislative Council is meeting today at this emergency session, to discuss plans which 
are able to protect Jerusalem from the settlement dangers which threaten it, after the 
failure of all the international efforts during the last two years to stop the current Israeli 
government. ,,40 
Palestinians will use all means to defend the city, Arafat told a special meeting of 
the Palestinian Legislative Council in Ramallah. "The battle for Jerusalem is a battle of 
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life and death for the Palestinian people," Arafat said. The Netanyahu government, he 
added, "wants to change the Arabic nature of the sacred city, and deface its cultural 
sites." In his speech, Arafat said that the Palestinians would never settle for Israeli control 
over all of the city. "The patience of the Palestinian leadership and the Palestinian people 
has run out," Arafat said. "Let Netanyahu and his government know that Jerusalem is a 
red line, and that there is not one person among us who would make concessions on any 
grain of soil of Jerusalem." 
In his most serious challenge to Netanyahu, the chairman of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization lashed out at Israel's government for its policies of expanding 
Jewish settlements in occupied Arab lands and refusing to discuss the sharing of 
Jerusalem, which Israel and the PLO claim as their capitaL "We cannot keep silent. We 
cannot tolerate this hellish plan that they are carrying out with toughness and 
stubbornness," declared the president of the self-ruled Palestinian Authority, condemning 
Netanyahu's government for dragging its feet on peace negotiations. The Palestinian 
. negotiators, aware of Israel's view that Jerusalem is non-negotiable and fearful of Israel's 
policy of continuing Jewish settlement in the Jerusalem area, felt that the postponement 
of the Jerusalem question only served Israel's policy of imposing accomplished facts. 
Israel's refusal to cease settlement activity, however, continued to cast dark shadows over 
the Holy City and its future. 
Whenever Arafat delivers a speech in an organized meeting, he uses the notion of 
"jihad" and cites verses of the Koran to support his argument for the liberation of the 
Holy City from Israel. He emphasizes that the commitment still stands, and the oath is 
valid: that. they will continue this long jihad, this difficult jihad-via deaths, via battles. He 
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also vows that they will continue this bloodbath until the Palestinian boys and girls wave 
the flag of Palestine over the walls of Jerusalem. 
Arafat delivered a speech at a Johannesburg mosque after the Mandela 
inauguration on May 10, 1994. Arafat's speech revolved primarily around the issue of 
Jerusalem. Be said that the Cairo agreement was merely the first step and that the 
liberation of Jerusalem was the Muslims' main objective. Be called on the Palestinian 
people to launch a jihad in a bid to liberate Jerusalem. 
C. OPPONENTS OF THE PEACE PROCESS 
Abdel Aziz Rantisi, co-founder of the militant Islamic opposition group Barnas, 
declared in an interview by Martin Regg Cohn of the Toronto Star, that The Quran, 
Islam's holy book, commanded him to wipe Israel off the map. There can be no 
compromise, no co-existence, only jihad, or holy war. According to the Quran, he stated 
laconically, "Jews will be dismissed from Palestine, and Jerusalem will be liberated by 
Muslims.,,41 Therefore, a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict has mutually exclusive 
satisfaction. According to the Barnas, Arafat's peace talks with the Israelis are illegal. 
Many Palestinians feel that the PLO chairman made a mistake when he approved 
the Declaration of Principles, that there was no need to recognize the state of Israel and 
shake Rabin's hand in Washington. Most Palestinians, including those who are not 
sworn supporters of Rarnas, Islarnic Jihad and rejectionist fronts, are suspicious that 
Israel does not intend to repeat the Gaza-Jerico format in the West Bank. 
One of the leaders of Islamic Jihad in Darnascus told the pan-Arab al-Hayat 
newspaper that the assassination of Arafat and other PLO leaders who endorsed the 
Palestinian-Israeli Declaration of Principles (DOP), and the so-called Gaza-Jericho first 
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· accord, could not be ruled out. Speaking to the paper's Damascus correspondent, 
Suleiman Nimr, the unnamed Jihad official said: "Ever since we made our presence 
known through our jihad operations in the Occupied Territories, we have relied on our 
secret organization to pursue the Zionist enemy and his followers, along with the 
followers of those who signed the agreement in the Territories if they stand against our 
jihad." Asked if this meant Islamic Jihad would try to assassinate Arafat and his group, 
the Jihad official said: "Every traitor to the Palestinian cause will one day face a Khaled 
Islambouli [the Egyptian Islamist who was involved in the assassination of President 
Anwar Sadat] from our people who will hold him to account and make him pay the 
price." He added, "They say the Palestinians have no option other than this agreement. 
Although this is a lie and fallacy, we must hold to account those who brought us to this 
option." 
Islamic Jihad and Hamas have joined eight other dissident Palestinian 
organizations in a Damascus-based alliance dedicated to foiling the Gaza -Jericho accord. 
Other members of the alliance include the PFLP, the second-largest PLO group, the 
radical wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). In an 
interview with Nimr in Damascus, PFLP leader George Habash denounced Arafat as a 
traitor, declaring that 
[h]istory will record that Arafat committed national treason against the 
Palestinian people and its struggle, and against every martyr that fell for 
the liberation of Palestine. History will record that Arafat betrayed every 
martyr's mother who offered her son to the Revolution for the sake of the 
return [of the Palestinians to their homeland] and the eviction of the 
occupation. And history has no mercy on traitors.42 
Habash vowed that the PFLP and the rest of the ten rejectionist Palestinian groups 
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would fight with everything they possessed against this agreement, relying on the 
Palestinian masses. Thus, it was crucial to organize the ten nationalist organizations that 
rejected the agreement into a single front, including brothers in Ramas and Islamic Jihad, 
to strip Arafat and his group of all legitimacy, take the PLO back to its nationalist line 
and National Charter, and bring down this agreement. The rejectionist group believed that 
Arafat and his group forfeited their legitimacy the moment they signed the Gaza-Jericho 
accord, which contradicts the principles of the National Charter on which the PLO was 
built.43 
Ramas pledges to continue violent resistance to Israel until Jerusalem is liberated. 
In a leaflet distributed in Jerusalem, Ramas said that "popular resistance in all its forms 
mainly jihad (holy war) operations to liberate Jerusalem." Ramas has also disseminated a 
leaflet in the territories describing Arafat as it traitor and claiming that he fell prey to the 
Oslo trap and does not have the courage to admit his mistake. The leaflet called on the 
residents of the territories to remove the occupation in the only possible way, that of 
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Ramas also sent a statement to the leading Saudi daily Asharq al-Awsat blasting 
Arafat for condemning the slaying of Israeli settler Raim Mizrahi by members of his own 
Fateh faction. The PLO chairman's actions are clear evidence that Arafat and his 
supporters have abandoned the cause of the Palestinian people and the liberation of 
Jerusalem in favor of Zionist hegemony over the region. According to Ramas, the 
backsliding of Arafat and his supporters, their condemnation of the operation and their 
pledge to stand against the actions of the resistance, clearly indicate that the principle 
mission of the defeated and misguided faction in the frail self-government will be to 
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suppress the people's mujahideen, throw them in jail, kill them and send them into exile 
in defense of the Zionist.45 
The lack of any tangible progress in the bilateral negotiations (Israel and PLO) is 
increasingly generating opposition to the format and strategy of negotiations among the 
Palestinians, both within and outside the occupied territories. The Islamic Jihad 
Movement in Palestine has issued a call at this historic moment in which the enemy 
insists on continuing its rabid settlement campaign to Judaize Jerusalem. The call says: 
The conspiracy against Jerusalem is a natural outcome of the agreements 
of capitulation and disgrace in Oslo, Cairo, Taba and Hebron which 
consecrated and legitimized the entity of the enemy in our homeland, 
Palestine, in exchange for a powerless authority, which represents a tool of 
repression and coercion against our people to serve the Zionist occupation, 
to safeguard its security, and to execute its schemes and ambitions to make 
Jerusalem its eternal capital.46 
The PLO's Mufti (religious leader) of Jerusalem, Ikrama Sabri, made statements 
during a sermon delivered to a crowd of worshippers at the AI Aqsa Mosque, on the 
Temple Mount on July 11, 1997, and broadcast on the PLO's Voice of Palestine radio 
station. He said: "There is no one that can deny the Jews act deviously, as the Quran 
itself shows, and no one knows when they will be stopped. We must rise up against the 
occupation with all our might to achieve what we want." He added that "Jerusalem is 
under occupation and the Muslims of the world should liberate it by jihad and put it under 
Islamic and Arabic authority." 47 
The Mufti called holy war in 1995 to free the Holy city; in his speech, he said, 
"We consider ourselves holy warriors for this city, and we will not abandon it .... 
Muslims, I am sure that Israel will eventually be destroyed and that the settlements will 
be your spoils. ,,48 
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D. CONCLUSION 
Jerusalem became the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict when the Israelis declared 
the city its eternal capital. The PLO signed an irrevocable peace process with Israel. The 
Palestinian extremist groups (Hamas, Islamic Jihad) believe the peace process contradicts 
the principles of the National Charter on which the PLO was built and called Arafat and 
the Palestinian Authority traitors who must be assassinated. These groups also vowed to 
step up their armed attacks against Arafat and the Israelis in order to abort the treacherous 
Ziononist-PLO accord. Both Arabs and Israelis alike believe they have a legitimate claim 
to the city. Since both sides consider Jerusalem their capital, it may seem that there is no 
room for compromise over its century-old disputes. 
38 
V. CONCLUSION 
The future status of Jerusalem remains the thorniest unresolved problem at issue 
between Arabs and Israelis. Before the occupation of Israel in 1967, the city served as the 
religious site for the three monotheistic faiths-Islam, Judaism and Christianity. It was· 
after Israel annexed East Jerusalem and declared it to be its eternal capital that the 
conflict reached its culmination, and politicization of the city began. Since then, the city 
has become the heart of the conflict between Arabs and Israelis; and it also has become 
an object to test the patriotism and nationalism of both Arab and Israeli political figures. 
The Israeli government passed legislation incorporating East Jerusalem and 
adjacent parts of the West Bank into Israel. It adopted the law in order to integrate 
Jerusalem into the administrative spheres of a Jewish city and to affirm the Basic Law, 
that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, It also excluded any reference to the annexation 
and sovereignty of the city on the part of the Israelis. However, the international 
community claimed that East Jerusalem had been occupied, not "liberated and unified," 
and that Israel must abide by international law. 
Indeed, the main purpose of this law proved to be more political than judicial 
because it underlined the political reality of the existing legislation. What encouraged this 
decision was the division of Jerusalem after 1948 and the belief of many Israelis that 
"Jerusalem" is the heart of their struggle for a homeland and is theirs by divine right. 
As the peace settlement has become more possible, the perception of external 
threat from the Arab states has weakened, but has exacerbated the deep divisions within 
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Israeli society and its political parties. As a consequence, the ideological gap between the 
two major political parties (Labor and Likud) has widened. 
The Likud Party and its allies advocate keeping the occupied territories and 
Jerusalem for ideological and security reasons, claiming that withdrawal to their 1967 
boundaries would be detrimental to the defense of the country. The Labor Party, on the 
other hand, has a different view. While some Labor hawks advocate keeping the land for 
security purposes, most of the party sees the occupied land as a bargaining chip to use 
against any United Nations effort to deprive them of it. Both political parties, however, 
have vowed to keep Jerusalem a united city under Israeli sovereignty. 
The Likud party and its allies were cynical about the sincerity and faith of the 
Labor party towards the status of Jerusalem as an eternal capital of the Jewish state. 
During the 1996 election campaign, to convince the Jewish people that the Labor party 
was untrustworthy, the Likud harped on one message in particular: "Peres [Labor leader] 
will divide Jerusalem." In retaliation against Likud's allegation, Teddy Kollek (ex-mayor 
of Jerusalem) referred to the peace made by Likud with Egypt, stressing that it was Likud 
that gave up Sinai and uprooted settlements there, and it was the Labor government that 
united the city. 
When Natanyahu and the Likud won the election, he snuffed out the faint light 
existing at the end of the tunnel for the future of Jerusalem by approving the expansion of 
existing settlements in Jerusalem and to the west. In retaliation, Chairman Yasser Arafat 
warned that the government's new plan for strengthening Israel's hold over Jerusalem 
could jeopardize hopes for peace; and he vowed that Palestinians would use all means to 
stand against the city's expansion. To further exacerbate the situation, Islamic Jihad, 
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together with some eight other dissident Palestinians groups, adamantly rejected the 
whole principle of Arab-Israel peace negotiation. All radical groups called for Jihad (holy 
war) against what they called the conspiracy and judaization of Jerusalem; and they all 
condemned Chairman Arafat and his group as traitors who committed national treason 
against the Palestinian people in particular and the Islamic world in generaL The most 
strident among radical oppositions is the Barnas group. Barnas leaders reminded the Arab 
and Moslem world of the Islamic position, which says that if one inch of the Moslems' 
land is occupied, then they must liberate it with all their means. 
Jerusalem has become so polarized because it is so entangled in the domestic 
politics of each side; thus, none of the many proposed solutions to sharing Jerusalem is 
likely to work. There is no shortage of creative, viable solutions to sharing Jerusalem. 
There is a shortage, however, of the domestic political space necessary for the issue to be 
treated as a technical, bilateral issue only. More than any other final status issue, 
Jerusalem has become so embroiled in domestic political discourse and processes that it 
has become an issue impossible to solve bilaterally. It goes without saying that if the 
issue of Jerusalem can not be solved, then the Arab-Israeli conflict will continue to drag 
on for years to come. 
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